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A Fifth Amendment Taking Clause




The state of Pennsylvania sits atop an enormous reserve of coal
that can be extracted by the surface, or strip mining method.' Re-
moving the coal by the surface mining method, however, entails a
number of environmental problems ranging from acid water pollu-
tion to soil erosion.2 Thus, whether Pennsylvania's rich endowment
is to be a blessing or a curse depends heavily on the exercise of the
state's regulatory power.
Pennsylvania has regulated surface mining for many years,3
while the federal government only recently began to take an active
role in the regulation of surface mining.4 The congressional frame-
work for surface mining regulation is designed to induce the states to
adopt and to enforce as their own a set of minimum standards drawn
up on the federal level. Pennsylvania has responded by amending its
surface mining statute to comply with the comprehensive and rigor-
ous federal standards. Constitutional challenges to the federal min-
ing standards have been brought,5 including assertions that certain
1. Surface mining is defined as
the extraction of minerals from the earth or from waste or stock piles or from pits or
banks by removing the strata or material which overlies or is above or between them
or otherwise exposing and retrieving them from the surface, including but not limited
to strip, auger mining, dredging, quarrying and leaching, and all surface activity con-
nected with surface or underground mining including but not limited to exploration,
site preparation, entry, tunnel, drift, slope, shaft and borehole drilling and construc-
tion activities related thereto, but not including those portions of mining operations
carried out beneath the surface by means of shafts, tunnels or other underground
openings.
52 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1396.3 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
A 1976 estimate put Pennsylvania's remaining stripable reserves of bituminous coal at
2,272,000,000 short tons. Assuming a constant rate of extraction at 1976 levels (45,946,000
short tons) it would take over four hundred years to deplete the supply. H.R. REP. No. 218,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 612.
2. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining Conservation Act of 1945, P.L. No.
1198, § 2.
4. See infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 129-70 and accompanying text.
regulations will amount to a "taking" or private property for public
use without just compensation in contravention of the fifth6 and
fourteenth7 amendments. To the extent that Pennsylvania law is in
accord with these federal standards it is similarly vulnerable to this
constitutional challenge, as well as to challenges under the Penn-
sylvania Constitution.'
Regulation of surface mining, of course, does not entail physical
appropriation of private property by the state. The United States
Supreme Court has held, however, that in certain circumstances
property may be "taken" in a constitutional sense by regulation of its
beneficial use by the owner.9 While courts of Pennsylvania have not
been receptive to this interpretation of taking,' ° federal courts have
responded favorably to claims of taking by regulation. The federally
mandated surface mining provisions now incorporated into Penn-
sylvania law have been held to effect uncompensated takings of pri-
vate property in two federal district court cases. I ' The United States
Supreme Court has left the question open, holding that no justiciable
taking issue has been presented under the factual settings of those
cases,' 2 but writing in dicta that under a different factual situation
the challenged surface mining provisions might someday be stricken
on fifth amendment grounds.'
3
Meanwhile, the state of surface mining law in Pennsylvania re-
mains uncertain. This comment analyzes amendments to the Penn-
sylvania Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act14
(SMCRA), focusing on the provisions raising potential taking issues.
Review of federal and Pennsylvania decisions in the taking context
provides a background against which to test the constitutionality of
these provisions. In its final analysis, this comment endeavors to re-
solve some of the uncertainty surrounding SMCRA and presents a
prognosis for the future of the Act.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
9. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); infra notes 89-100 and
accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal Co., 232 Pa. 97, 81 A. 148 (1911); infra
notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
11. See State of Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ind. 1980); Va. Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980); infra notes 129-52 and
accompanying text.
12. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981);
Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981); infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text.
13. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2371 n.40
(1981). See also infra note 187 and accompanying text.
14. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1396.1-.25 (Purdon Supp, 1981).
II. The Statutes
A. The Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
In 1977, after years of controversy, Congress enacted a federal
SMCRA.' 5 Enactment of SMCRA, however, merely transferred the
controversy from the legislative to the judicial arena. The contro-
versy surrounding SMCRA still clamors for resolution despite pres-
entation of the matter before the United States Supreme Court.16
SMCRA sets forth a comprehensive and detailed set of require-
ments governing the surface mining of coal and other minerals.
Finding that the surface mining of coal affects interstate commerce
17
and that uniformity of regulation is essential in preventing unfair
competition from becoming an impediment to the enactment and en-
forcement of adequate state regulatory programs, 8 Congress,
through the SMCRA, effectively pre-empted surface mining regula-
tion. The pre-emption is a hybrid, however, and neither inflexible
nor complete. Congress found that "because of the diversity of ter-
rain, climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in ar-
eas subject to mining operations, the primary governmental
responsibility for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing
regulations for surface mining and reclamation operations ...
should rest with the states."' 9 SMCRA gives states a choice: (1) for-
mulate and submit to the Secretary of the Interior a statutory and
administrative regulatory program embodying the provisions of SM-
CRA,2 0 or (2) face the loss of primary jurisdiction over surface min-
ing within the state and subsequent imposition of a federal program
administered by the Department of the Interior.2'
Thus, a state may obtain "primacy," or primary jurisdiction,
over its surface mining by submitting a detailed program satisfactory
to the federal government. As a result, statutes and regulations en-
acted or promulgated by states to obtain primacy are often verbatim
copies of the various sections of the federal SMCRA and Code of
Federal Regulations. During the period between enactment of SM-
CRA and final approval of a state's program, surface mining within
a state is to be governed concurrently by existing state law and in-
terim regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior.22
As a practical matter, a state does not enjoy primary jurisdiction
even after approval of its program, since SMCRA reserves in the
15. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1979).
16. See infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
17. 30 U.S.C. § 12010) (Supp. 1979).
18. Id § 1201(g).
19. Id § 1201(0).
20. Id § 1253(a).
21. Id § 1254(a).
22. Id § 1252(e).
Secretary of the Interior the power to impose a federal program
upon a state if the state does not adequately implement or enforce its
approved program.23
B. Amendment of Pennsylvania Law to Comply with the Federal
SM CPA
In October 1980, the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended
SMCRA24 as a first step in gaining regulatory primacy over surface
mining within the state, declaring that it was "determined to be in
the public interest to secure primary jurisdiction over the enforce-
ment and administration of [the federal SMCRA] and that the Gen-
eral Assembly should amend this act to obtain approval of the
Pennsylvania program by the . . . Department of the Interior."2
The legislature added, however, that it was "the intent of this act to
preserve existing Pennsylvania law to the maximum extent
possible."26
Despite the stated intent of the General Assembly, the 1980
amendments effect rather sweeping changes in Pennsylvania law.
Many of the new provisions are taken verbatim from the federal
SMCRA. 27 The new law retains the requirement that any licensed
surface mining operator 28 must obtain a permit from the Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources (DER) before mining a particular
parcel of land.29 The application for the permit must be accompa-
nied by a detailed reclamation plan that includes the following ele-
ments: a statement of the uses and productivity of the land proposed
to be affected; a description of the manner in which compaction of
the soil and fill will be accomplished; a plan for segregation of top-
soil and revegetation; provision for restoration of original contour; a
timetable for completion of restoration; a plan for diversion of sur-
face water; a plan for complying with other environmental statutes; a
statement of proposed post-mining land use; a soil survey (if the land
has been identified as prime farmland); a demonstration that the
proposed operation will be conducted to maximize the utilization
and conservation of the coal removed; and such other information as
DER may require.3 °
23. Id § 1254(a)(3).
24. Act of Oct. 10, 1980, P.L. 835, No. 155 (amending 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
1396.1-.25).
25. Id at § 17.
26. Id
27. Compare, e.g., 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(e)(4) with 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(4)
(Supp. 1979).
28. "'Operator' shall mean a person or municipality engaged in surface mining, as a
principal as distinguished from an agent or independent contractor." 52 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1396.3 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
29. Id § 1396.3.
30. Id § 1396.4(a)(2).
Many of these provisions existed prior to the federal SMCRA.
Pennsylvania had already been enforcing one of the most stringent
regulatory programs in the nation.3 The federal SMCRA changes
existing law by strictly conditioning issuance of permits on an opera-
tor's demonstrated ability to comply with more difficult land restora-
tion requirements,32 by introducing new conditions to issuance of the
essential permit, and by providing for the complete prohibition of
surface mining in designated areas.33
C. Pennsylvania's Primacy Travail
Pennsylvania's efforts to obtain regulatory primacy over its sur-
face mining have finally proved successful. On February 29, 1980,
DER submitted its first proposed regulatory program. 34 On April
28, 1980, the regulatory package was adjudged incomplete by the
regional director of the Federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM) for
failure to comply with a number of regulations issued by the Depart-
ment of the Interior .3  Again, on October 22, 1980, OSM informed
DER that its resubmitted program failed to meet with approval, and
that an acceptable program would have to be submitted within sixty
days for the state to avoid imposition of a federal program. This
new deadline became moot, however, when on November 26, 1980,
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued an injunction to
the Secretary of DER prohibiting him or his agents from submitting
to OSM any regulatory program, or otherwise applying for primacy
until November 26, 1981 or until judicial challenges to the federal
SMCRA in the federal courts have been finally adjudicated.3 6 On
February 13, 1981, the commonwealth court enjoined DER from en-
31. It has been said that Pennsylvania's surface mining law was used by Congress as a
model for the federal SMCRA. See Rochow, The Far Side of the Paradox: State Regulation of
the Environmental Effects of Coal Mining, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 559, 567 (1979). Notably, 30
U.S.C. § 1272(e) (Supp. 1979) states prohibitions on mining in essentially the same terms as 52
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4b(c) (Purdon Supp. 1981), which predated the federal SMCRA.
32. The federal SMCRA and its Pennsylvania counterpart both provide for variances
from strict compliance with the restoration requirements. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1265(e) (Supp.
1979) (variance from requirement that mined land be restored to approximate original con-
tour). Operators have complained, however, that certain variance provisions allow them no
meaningful relief. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
33. See 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. 1979) and 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e (Purdon
Supp. 1981).
34. 45 Fed. Reg. 15,575 (1980).
35. 45 Fed. Reg. 28,166 (1980).
36. Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Commonwealth, No. 2718 (Pa. Commw. Ct.,
Nov. 26, 1980), appeal dismissed as moot, 444 A.2d 637 (1982). Although Judge Crumlish did
not issue an opinion with the injunction, it is reasonable to assume that he was persuaded by at
least one of the coal companies' arguments. The companies contend that implementation of
the new regulatory program would deprive them of their property without due process and
without just compensation, subject them to duplicative regulations, irreparably harm the coal
industry in Pennsylvania, frustrate the General Assembly's express intent to preserve Penn-
sylvania law to the maximum extent, and subject Pennsylvania coal producers to a competitive
disadvantage with coal producers in Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Alabama, Virginia, West Vir-
forcing regulations that DER's Environmental Quality Board
promulgated on December 20, 1980.17
Currently, judicial challenges to the federal SMCRA are tempo-
rarily resolved,"8 and on July 30, 1982, the Secretary of the Interior
approved DER's resubmitted plan, stating that termination of ap-
proval would be initiated on May 5, 1983, unless certain "minor defi-
ciencies" were remedied. 9
III. Contexts in which the Taking Issue May Arise4"
The 1980 amendments aligned Pennsylvania law with the sur-
face mining standards mandated by the federal government, but at
the same time exposed Pennsylvania's surface mining regulatory
scheme to the same types of constitutional attacks that have been
leveled against the nearly identical provisions of the federal SM-
CRA.4' The taking issue may arise in the application of at least
three reclamation provisions of the Pennsylvania SMCRA:
(1) In no case shall the department grant a permit to affect prime
farmland unless after consultation with the United States
Department of Agriculture the department finds in writing
that the operator has the technological capability to restore
such affected area within a reasonable time to equivalent or
higher levels of yield as nonaffected prime farmland in the
ginia, Tennessee, and Illinois, where implementation of the federal SMCRA had already been
enjoined.
Although the injunction prevented DER from meeting the December 22, 1980, deadline,
Pennsylvania did not lose its opportunity to obtain primacy as a result. The federal SMCRA
provides that if a state court has enjoined SMCRA implementation, the state shall enjoy a one
year grace period. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(d) (Supp. 1979). At the time the injunction was issued,
two cases in which various SMCRA provisions had been held unconstitutional were pending
before the United States Supreme Court. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text. Al-
though these judicial challenges had been adjudicated, these decisions did not eliminate the
controversy over the injunction then pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. DER
contended that the injunction was improperly issued and that the Commonwealth Court im-
properly failed to require posting of a bond by the coal companies prior issuance of the injunc-
tion. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was seeking damages against the coal companies
for loss of federal funds allegedly caused by the delay in obtaining primacy occasioned by
issuance of the injunction. Brief for Appellant at 33, Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Com-
monwealth, No. 2718 (Pa. Commw. Ct., Nov. 26, 1980). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
however, over the dissenting voice of Justice Larsen, refused to consider the merits of the case,
dismissing the appeal as moot because the Commonwealth Court's injunction had expired on
November I1, 1981. Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 444 F.2d 637 (1982).
37. Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Commonwealth, No. 2718 (Pa. Commw. Ct.,
Feb. 13, 1981) (order enjoining enforcement of regulations promulgated at 10 Pa. Admin. Bull.
4789 (1980)).
38. See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text.
39. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33050 (1982), amending, 30 C.F.R. § 938.
40. These sections of the Pennsylvania SMCRA are possibly vulnerable to fifth
amendment attack because the corresponding federal SMCRA provisions have been so
challenged. See infra notes 129-70 and accompanying text.
The taking issue may arise out of administrative searches and the fixing of liens under the
SMCRA. These issues, however, have not been raised in any reported case. See Comment,
Constitutional Issues in the Reclamation of Orphaned Lands under the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (1979).
41. See infra notes 129-70 and accompanying text.
surrounding area under equivalent levels of
management . *42
(2) In the case of anthracite or bituminous coal mining, the rec-
lamation plan shall provide for contouring, except that ter-
racing shall be permitted if the operator demonstrates and
the department finds in writing that the area proposed to be
affected had been previously mined prior to current practices
and standards, the area proposed to be affected cannot be
reclaimed by contouring, and reaffecting the area is likely to
produce an environmentel benefit.4 3
(3) The department shall not approve any post mining land use
unless the application demonstrates that the operation will
restore the land affected to a condition capable of supporting
the uses it was capable of supporting prior to any mining, or
to higher or better uses. 44
Although the reclamation provisions of the Pennsylvania SM-
CRA appear quite reasonable on their face, the practical effect of
these provisions is that if a permit applicant lacks the technological
capability to restore the land in accordance with the requirements of
the Pennsylvania mining law, DER will deny the permit. Refusal of
DER to issue a mining permit to the applicant effectively prevents
use of the coal, since the applicant cannot remove it from the
ground. Even if the mandated reclamation is technologically feasi-
ble, compliance with the reclamation requirements of the Penn-
sylvania SMCRA may be so financially burdensome to an operator
mining outfit that it becomes economically unfeasible to remove the
coal. If so, the economics of the mining operation effectively pro-
duce the same result as the denial of an application for a mining
permit-the owner of the coal is prevented from making use of his
property.
The Pennsylvania SMCRA also contains three prohibitory pro-
visions that are potentially more restrictive on the use of coal than
are the regulatory provisions:
(4) [T~he department may designate an area as unsuitable for all
or certain types of surface mining operations if such opera-
42. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4(a)(2)(J) (Purdon Supp. 1981), corresponding to 30
U.S.C. § 1260(d)(1) (Supp. 1979). Prime farmland is defined as "any land which is defined by
the Secretary of Agriculture in 7 C.F.R. § 657 . . .and which have historically been used for
cropland." 25 PA. CODE § 86.1 (1980) (Reserved). This section and others noted herein are
"reserved" due to the injunction issued by the Commonwealth Court in Pennsylvania Coal
Mining Ass'n v. Commonwealth. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. These reserved
regulations are reprinted in 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4789. Section 86.1 is reprinted at 4792.
43. 52 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4(a)(2)(E)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1981), corresponding to
30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (Supp. 1979). "'Contouring' shall mean reclamation of the land af-
fected to approximate original contour. ... 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.3 (Purdon
Supp. 1981). Section 1396.4(a)(3)(E)(i) provides for a variance from this restoration provision
"'in cases where the land is proposed to be made suitable after mining and reclamation for
currently planned or designed industrial, commercial, agricultural, residential, recreational or
public use."
44. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4(a)(2)(I) (Purdon Supp. 1981), corresponding to 30
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
tions will: (1) be incompatible with existing State or local
land use plans or programs; (2) affect fragile or historical
land in which such operations could result in significant
damage to important historical, cultural, scientific, and aes-
thetic values and natural systems; (3) affect renewable re-
source lands in which such operations could result in a
substantial loss or reduction of long range productivity of
water supply or food fiber products . . .; (4) affect natural
hazard lands in which such operations could substantially
endanger life and property. ...-
(5) Subject to valid existing rights as they are defined under
§ 522 of the federal SMCRA no surface mining operations
except those which existed on August 3, 1977, shall be per-
mitted:. . . (3) which will adversely affect any public owned
park or places included in the National Register of Historical
Sites. . .; (4) within one hundred feet of the outside right-of-
way line of any public road . . .; (5) within three hundred
feet from any occupied dwelling, unless waived by the owner
thereof, nor within three hundred feet of any public building,
school, church, community, nor institutional building, public
park, or within one hundred feet of a cemetery.46
(6) No operator shall conduct surface mining operations within
one hundred feet of the bank of any stream. The Depart-
ment may, however, grant a variance from this distance re-
quirement if the operator demonstrates beyond a reasonable
doubt that there will be no adverse hydrologic or water qual-
ity impacts as a result of the variance. Such variance shall be
issued as a written order specifying the methods and tech-
niques that must be employed to prevent adverse impacts,
prior to granting any such variance, the operator shall be re-
quired to give public notice of his application thereof in two
(2) successive weeks. Should any person file any exception to
the proposed variance within twenty (20) days of the last
publication thereof, the Department shall conduct a public
hearing with respect thereto. The Department shall also con-
sider any information or comments submitted by the Penn-
sylvania Fish Commission prior to taking action on any
variance request.4 7
Application of the three prohibitory provisions of the Pennsylvania
SMCRA would forbid the surface mining of coal altogether in areas
45. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981), corresponding to 30
U.S.C. § 1272(a)(1) (Supp. 1979). Section 1396.4e(a) also requires DER to designate an area
unsuitable for surface mining if the Secretary should determine that reclamation is technologi-
cally infeasible. For regulations governing the designation of areas unsuitable for surface min-
ing see 25 PA. CODE §§ 86.121-.129 (1980) (Reserved), reprinted in 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4789,
4804-06.
46. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(h) (Purdon Supp. 1981), corresponding to 30
U.S.C. § 1722(e) (Supp. 1979). The prohibitions of this section are not new in Pennsylvania
surface mining law. See infra notes 72 and 241 and accompanying text. Section 1396.4e(h) is
included in this analysis because its nearly identical counterpart in the federal SMCRA has
been held unconstitutional on two occasions in the federal courts. See infra notes 144 and 152
and accompanying text.
47. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(i) (Purdon Supp. 1981). The prohibition of sur-
face mining within one hundred feet of the bank of a stream is potentially the most devastating
provision of the Pennsylvania SMCRA when one considers that there are 50,000 miles of
streams in Pennsylvania.
designated by the State, including a buffer zone around designated
areas. The imposition on the rights of a property owner by the Penn-
sylvania mining laws has the greatest impact upon the owner of a fee
only in the mineral estate beneath."a Denial of a permit to extract
the minerals to the owner of the mineral estate by DER would be
tantamount to destruction of the estate, and neither the federal nor
the Pennsylvania SMCRA provides for compensation. 9
Perhaps in anticipation of fifth amendment challenges, Con-
gress and the Pennsylvania General Assembly included provisos
designed to mitigate the harshness of these prohibitory provisions.
The provision for designating areas unsuitable for surface mining,50
for example, is inapplicable to operations in which "substantial legal
and financial commitments"'" were in existence prior to enactment
of the federal SMCRA. Similarly, the provision that forbids surface
mining within specified distances of designated places52 is subject to
"valid existing rights."5 3 The Secretary of the Interior has taken the
position that only the interests of operators who had obtained all
48. In Pennsylvania, there are three separate estates in land: the surface; the underlying
minerals; and the right to support of the surface so that removal of the minerals will not result
in the subsidence of the land. The surface and the mineral estates may be held separately. If
the owner of the mineral estates owns the right of support as well, the mineral estate owner
actually has the "right to subside." See Smith v. Glen Allen Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 304, 32
A.2d 227, 234 (1943); 24 P.L.E. Mining § 19 (1960).
49. The federal SMCRA does provide for a "coal exchange program" by which coal
estate owners who are deprived of the use of their coal by the operation of 30 U.S.C.
§ 1260(b)(5) (Supp. 1979) (pertaining to interruption of farming on alluvial valley floors) may
be leased or granted coal rights on federal land. This program, however, applies only if the
affected property is located west of one hundred degrees west longitude, and, therefore, does
not encompass Pennsylvania. Under 30 U.S.C. § 1237(c) (Supp. 1979), the Secretary of the
Interior is empowered to acquire lands adversely affected by "past surface mining practices."
Id
50. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(a) and (b) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See supra note
45 and accompanying text.
51. Id § 1396.4e(e); 25 PA. CODE § 86.101 (1980) (Reserved), reprinted in 10 Pa. Admin.
Bull. 4789, 4801, defines this phrase as
significant investments that have been made prior to January 4, 1977, on the basic
[sic] of a long term contract in power plants' railroads, mineral handling, preparation,
extraction or storage facilities and other capital intensive activities. Costs of acquir-
ing the minerals in place or of the right to mine it without an existing mine are not
sufficient commitments, standing alone, to constitute substantial legal and financial
commitments.
Id See also 30 C.F.R. § 762.5 (1980), using nearly identical language.
52. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(h) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
53. 25 PA. CODE § 86.1 defines "valid existing rights" to include
(i) those property fights in existence on August 3, 1977, that were created by legally
binding conveyance, lease, deed, contract or other document which authorizes the
applicant to produce minerals by a surface mining operation; and provided further
that the person proposing to conduct surface mining operations on such lands holds
all current State and Federal permits necessary to conduct such operations on those
lands and either held those permits on August 3, 1977, or had made by that date a
complete application for the permits, variances, and approvals required by the
Department.
(iv) valid existing rights does not mean mere expectation of a right to conduct sur-
face mining operations. ...
necessary permits prior to August 3, 1977, the date of enactment of
the federal SMCRA, are protected. 4 Under this view, one who held
a mineral estate in land prior to that date but who had not obtained
all necessary permits would be subject to the prohibitory provisions
of the federal and state SMCRA. The attempt at mitigating the se-
vere impact of the prohibitory provisions of the SMCRA of Penn-
sylvania can properly be seen as illusory.
DER may also mitigate the effect of the prohibition on surface
mining within one hundred feet of a bank of a stream by granting to
a mining operator a variance." How illusory this section will be in
its effects depends on the policy the Department adopts in adminis-
tering the variance program. A similar provision in the Clean
Streams Law has, however, been in effect for several years.56 The
provisions of the Pennsylvania SMCRA require the operator to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that no adverse hydrologic
or water quality impact will result from the variance," which may be
a difficult burden for a mining operator.
IV. Eminent Domain, The Police Power, and Pennsylvania Law
The Constitution of Pennsylvania forbids the taking of private
property for public use without compensation. 58 An aggrieved sur-
face mining operator who believes that his property has been effec-
tively taken by a denial of a permit under one of the provisions of
the SMCRA, however, would do well to forego vindication of his
rights under Pennsylvania law and pursue his remedy under the
fourteenth amendment59 of the United States Constitution in federal
court. Both the General Assembly and the courts of Pennsylvania
have treated the word "taken" in its literal sense - a physical appro-
priation of property by the state. Accordingly, a taking pursuant to
eminent domain under Pennsylvania law6" should not be mistaken
for the state's exercise of its police power to protect the health, safety,
morals, and welfare of the public. This distinction between eminent
domain and police power was at one time embodied in the Penn-
Id (emphasis added), reprinted in 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4789, 4791. See also 30 C.F.R. § 761.5
(1980), using nearly identical language.
54. See Brief for Appellee at 48, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
55. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4(a)(2)(E) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.315(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
57. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4(a)(2)(E) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
58. PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Taking of private property by a state without just com-
pensation is a violation of the due process clause. Chicago B&O R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897).
60. See Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code, 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101-371 (Pur-
don Supp. 198 1). Eminent domain is the right of the state to take private property without the
consent of the owner when the public need exists. The owner of the property must be compen-
sated for his loss. Briegel v. Briegel, 307 Pa. 93, 160 A. 581 (1932).
sylvania Constitution, which in part commanded that "the exercise
of the police power of the State shall never be adjudged or so con-
strued as to permit corporations to conduct their business in such a
manner as to infringe the equal rights of individuals or the general
well being of the State.'
The appellate courts of Pennsylvania have viewed with disfavor
the idea that regulation of the use of private property may under
certain circumstances constitute a taking. Many of the cases in
which the taking by regulation issue has arisen have sprung from
Pennsylvania's extensive regulation of its coal mining industry. De-
spite the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements to the con-
trary,62 the rule laid down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
1911 prevails in the state today. In Commonwealth v. Plymouth Coal
Co., 63 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the state, as long
as it is engaging in a legitimate exercise of its police power, may
regulate the use of private property even to the extent that the prop-
erty is as a result rendered worthless. The owner of property in
Pennsylvania need only be compensated for the diminution of the
value of his property caused when the state uses its right of eminent
domain.'
Thus, the appellate courts of Pennsylvania have adhered to a
rigid eminent domain-police power dichotomy in the face of taking
challenges under both federal and Pennsylvania constitutions. Ap-
parently, the only limitation on the police power recognized by the
Pennsylvania courts is that the particular regulation must be suffi-
ciently reasonable to pass a due process test. In Commonwealth v.
Plymouth Coal Co., for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
addressed a controversy analogous to that which have arisen under
the federal SMCRA in other states.65 The Anthracite Mining Act of
189166 had required that mine operators leave intact a pillar of coal
along adjacent mines for the protection of mine workers and to
prevent flooding of adjacent mine shafts. The court denied the coal
61. PA. CONST. art. XVI, § 3 (repealed 1967). Although this section has been repealed, it
is arguably still a part of Pennsylvania law. See City of Scranton v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 268
Pa. 192, 195, 110 A. 775, 776 (1920) ("Art. XVI, § 3 is but declaratory of an implied power of
the State, inherent in all forms of government. . . and it needs no constitutional reservation or
declaration to support it.")
62. See infra notes 89 and 90 and accompanying text. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's refusal to recognize that state regulation or action not taken pursuant to eminent do-
main may constitute a taking has led to reversal by the United States Supreme Court on at
least two occasions. See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.2d 123 (1961),
rev'd, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (aircraft noise from county operated airport held to effect a taking of
nearby residents' property); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute that
prohibited mining of coal held to deprive owner of its property without just compensation).
See infra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
63. 232 Pa. 141, 81 A. 148 (1911), afl'd, 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
64. 232 Pa. at 149, 81 A. at 152.
65. See infra notes 129-70 and accompanying text.
66. Act of June 2, 1891, P.L. 176.
company's claim that this requirement took its property without
compensation in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution, 67 dis-
tinguishing "use" of property from its "ownership. '68 The require-
ment that the pillar of coal be left intact did not effect a physical
appropriation of the coal for public use. Even though the law effec-
tively deprived the owner of all practical use of the coal, the coal was
still under his possession and ownership. The court concluded its
analysis by finding the requirement a reasonable exercise of the
state's police power.
Although the United States Supreme Court has since expanded
the inquiry in taking by regulation cases beyond the two-step analy-
sis applied in Plymouth Coal Co., 69 the appellate courts of Penn-
sylvania have continued to cite and to follow the Plymouth Coal Co.
line of cases.7" In Harger v. Commonwealth,7' an operator had been
denied an exception to the statutory prohibition against surface min-
ing within three hundred feet of any occupied dwelling.72 The oper-
ator brought an action against the state for compensation for the coal
that it was prohibited from mining, relying on a statute that empow-
ers the state mining commission to assess damages for coal required
to be left in place under lands "condemned or otherwise acquired"
by the state.73 Noting that the General Assembly deemed the act to
be an exercise of the state's police power, the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court held the denial uncompensable with the flat asser-
tion that "[w]here the Commonwealth, through the exercise of its
police powers restricts the use of property, no compensation for dim-
inution in value is payable."74 Being an exercie of police power, the
67. PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("Nor shall private property be taken or applied to public use
without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured").
68. 232 Pa. at 150, 81 A. at 151.
69. This inquiry consisted of first determining whether the challenged statute was an
exercise of the police power, and second, whether that exercise was reasonable.
70. See also Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926) (reaching the same result
and in substantially the same language as Plymouth Coal Co.).
71. 9 Pa. Commonw. 482, 308 A.2d 171 (1973).
72. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4b(c) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
73. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1501 (Purdon 1966).
74. 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 485, 308 A.2d at 172. The intransigence of the Pennsylvania
courts on the taking by regulation issue is further demonstrated in two recent zoning cases,
Reilly v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. Commw. 608, 391 A.2d 56 (1978) and Gaebel v. Thornbury
Township, 8 Pa. Commw. 399, 303 A.2d 57 (1973). In each case the plaintiffs land had been
zoned to prohibit development beyond a rural level. The commonwealth court in
each case held against the plaintiff-property owner, citing Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A.
409 (1926). See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The lone dissenter in Gaebel seemed to
be more in accord with the inquiry laid down by the United States Supreme Court than with
the summary inquiry of Pennsylvania Coal Co. engaged in by the majority. See supra note 69
and accompanying text. The dissenter suggested that the determination of whether zoning has
effected a taking in a constitutional sense is one that can be made only upon examination of a
factual record, a record that the dissenter did not believe was present in this case. Cf. Hodel v.
Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981) (no justiciable controversy presented because plaintiffs had not
coal could not be considered "otherwise acquired"7 5 within the
meaning of the statute.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has most recently considered
the constitutional taking question with regard to the Pennsylvania
Clean Streams Act.7 6 In Commonwealth v. Barnes and Tucker Co., 
7 7
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Commonwealth's right
to prohibit drainage of acid mine water into streams of the Com-
monwealth. The challenge arose in the context of DER's order to
Barnes and Tucker to abate the discharge of acid waste from one of
their mines. The Clean Streams Act classifies the charge of acid
mine water as a public nuisance. 78 In order to abate the public nui-
sance, DER ordered Barnes and Tucker to pump the water out of the
mine, effectively stopping Barnes and Tucker's operation at the
mine. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed Barnes and
Tucker's taking claim, since DER had authority under the Clean
Streams Act to prevent the discharge of pollutants, including acid
mine water, into the waters of the Commonwealth. Barnes and
Tucker were unable to demonstrate the unreasonableness of DER's
order in comparison to alternative methods to abate the public nui-
sance, or that the order was unduly harsh in its economic impact.79
The decision in Barnes and Tucker8" is particularly relevant to
the provision of Pennsylvania's version of SMCRA that prohibits
mining within one hundred feet of the bank of a stream.8' The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently has taken a liberal ap-
proach to viewing the exercise of the Commonwealth's police power
in the environmental area, which would bode well for challenges to
SMCRA in state courts.82
identified any particular property alleged to have been taken by operation of a regulatory
statute). In response to the majority's narrow police power inquiry, the dissenter asked rhetor-
ically, "Would we ever permit property to be taken for a police station without compensation
just because of the great need for police protection in the area?" 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 410, 303
A.2d at 64.
75. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 1501 (Purdon 1966).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-760.2 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1981).
77. 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1978).
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.503 (Purdon 1977).
79. 472 Pa. at 128, 371 A.2d at 467.
80. 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1978).
81. 52 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4(e)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
82. See also Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 490 Pa. 399, 416 A.2d 995
(1980) (technology forcing constitutional under the Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, §§ 4001-4106 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1981)). National Wood Preserves v. Common-
wealth, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980) (owner of land, without a showing of fault, may be
ordered to abate a source of pollution originating on his land); Commonwealth v. Harman
Coal Co., 452 Pa. 77, 306 A.2d 308 (1973) (an order to abate discharge of acid mine water into
waters of the Commonwealth is a reasonable use of the police power). But see Commonwealth
v. Miller, 43 D. & C. 2d 361 (1967) (Mercer County) (borough ordinance prohibiting strip
mining of coal within borough limits held to effect a taking of private property without due
process and just compensation in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution).
From the foregoing discussion it appears to be of little coinci-
dence that the amended Pennsylvania SMCRA begins, "This act
shall be deemed to be an exercise of the police powers of the Com-
monwealth .. ."I Thus, it is likely that a taking challenge to the
Pennsylvania SMCRA in a Pennsylvania court would be afforded
the same summary treatment as was the statutory provision in Har-
ger and Barnes and Tucker. Since the claim of any operator that the
Pennsylvania SMCRA takes his property without just compensation
appears effectively foreclosed under the law as applied in Penn-
sylvania, analysis requires the examination of federal case law to de-
termine whether, under any set of facts, an operator might obtain
redress in federal court for interference with his property rights inci-
dent to the state's regulation of surface mining.
V. When Does Regulation Become A Taking?
A. The Traditional View and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon84
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution com-
mands that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.8" The early cases brought under the fifth amend-
ment established the view that it would be legally impossible under
any set of circumstances for a property owner to succeed on a taking
claim when regulation for public benefit had diminished or de-
stroyed the value of his property. 6 The rule was typically stated in
lugler v. Kansas. 87 "A prohibition simply upon the use of property
for purposes that are deemed, by valid legislation, to be injurious to
the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot in any just
sense be deemed a taking ... ""
By 1922, however, the United States Supreme Court ceased to
follow the rigid separation of regulation and taking espoused in
Mugler and conceded in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon89 that "the
question [of whether regulation effects a taking] depends upon the
83. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.1 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
84. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. This view apparently prevails in Pennsylvania today: See supra notes 65-83 and ac-
companying text.
87. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
88. Id at 668. Language to this effect persisted in Supreme Court opinions even after the
Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. discarded the notion that regulation of the use of property can
never amount to a taking. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), the Court stated that
"where the public interest is involved preferment of that interest over the property interest of
the individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics
of every exercise of the police power which affects property." Id at 279-80. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court relied upon Mulger v. Kansas, and not Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, in
Commonwealth v. Barnes and Tucker, 472 Pa. 115, 128, 371 A.2d 461 (1976), to uphold the
constitutionality of the Clean Streams Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-760.2 (Purdon 1977
& Supp. 1981). See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
89. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
particular facts." 90 In that case, the coal company had conveyed title
to the surface estate of a plot of land to the owner of a private dwell-
ing, but reserved the right to the underlying coal and the right to
subside the land.9' The surface owner petitioned for an injunction to
prevent the company from mining coal on the property, which could
cause subsidence of his house. Petitioner based the claim on a Penn-
sylvania statute that prohibited the mining of anthracite in a manner
which would cause subsidence of any dwelling house.92 Justice
Holmes, writing for the majority, reversed the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declaring that "[w]hen diminution in value caused
by regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act." 93
In reaching its result, the Court balanced two factors against the
diminution in value of the coal company's property caused by the
statutory requirement that the coal be left in the ground - the "public
interest shown by the statute"'94 and "reciprocity of advantage." 9
Public interest of the statute was limited.96 More important for mod-
em litigants, however, the Court went beyond the facts of the case to
find that the law could not be sustained as an exercise of the police
power "so far as it affects the mining of coal under streets and cities
in places where the right to mine coal has been reserved," since "[tjo
make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has nearly
the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or de-
stroying it." 97
Whatever may be the public interest in private dwellings, an
undisputed public interest exists in preventing subsidence of streets
and cities. Thus, the Mahon departure from Mugler dogma was
more radical than might appear at first glance. The Court in effect
said that a law which embodies a substantial public purpose may still
constitute a taking if it renders coal mining commercially impracti-
90. Id at 413.
91. In Pennsylvania, the right to subside is the inverse of the surface owner's right to
support of the surface as against the owner of the subsurface estate. The right to support is a
property right that may be held by one not the owner of either the surface or the subsurface
estate. See 24 P.L.E. Aining § 19 (1960).
92. Act of May 27, 1921, P.L. 1198.
93. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
94. 1d at 414.
95. Id at 415.
96. The Court justified this characterization by noting that "the statute does not ordina-
rily apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal." Id. at 414. As noted
by Justice Brandeis in his dissent, however, it is difficult to justify Holmes' characterization of
the statute's public interest as "limited." Id at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Act of May
27, 1921, provided that it would be unlawful "to conduct the operation of mining anthracite
coal so as to cause the caving in, collapse, or subsidence, of any public building, or any struc-
ture customarily used by the public, . . . any street, road, bridge or other public passageway
dedicated to public use or habitually used by the public."
97. 260 U.S. at 414.
cable although not physically impossible. The Court also found no
advantage from the statute accruing to the owner of the subsurface
estate. The Court employed this novel "reciprocity of advantage"
device to distinguish and circumvent its holding only eight years ear-
lier in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 98 in which it sustained the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding that a statute requiring a pil-
lar of coal to be left in place between adjacent mines did not effect a
taking. Plymouth Coal was distinguished on the ground that the pil-
lar of coal was for the safety of employees invited into the mine by
the owner; the statute therefore secured to the owner "an average
reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justification of
various laws."99
Literal judicial application of the language of Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon could invalidate the prohibitory and reclamatory re-
quirements of the Pennsylvania SMCRA. An owner of coal lands
would merely be required to demonstrate that the statute made ex-
traction of coal "commercially impracticable," that the objectionable
provision imported a "limited" public interest, 10o and that the provi-
sion gave him no reciprocal advantage. This result, however, has not
proved to be the legacy of Justice Holmes' Mahon opinion.
B. Recent Cases - Toward A Consistent Test
L Land Use. -Although Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon is
cited favorably in most recent Supreme Court cases addressing the
taking by regulation issue,' 0 ' the broad language used by Justice
Holmes to strike down the Pennsylvania statute clearly has not been
followed. Recent judicial homage to the decision, at best, stands
only for the proposition that it is theoretically possible for regulation
to become so oppressive in its economic impact that it constitutes an
uncompensated taking. Most likely the circumscription of Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. was because of a realization that the cost of com-
pensating property owners would inhibit all but the cheapest and
most compelling government regulation.
In the aftermath of the case, the Supreme Court has tried but
failed to develop a precise formula for determining at what point
98. 232 U.S. 531 (1914). See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
99. 260 U.S. at 415.
100. Recent litigants have succeeded on taking claims in part by showing that provisions
of SMCRA did not produce a public benefit, even though the statute purported to do so. See
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980),
rev'dsub noma. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981);
infra note 141 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
regulation of the use of property becomes a taking. 0 2 The Court has
proceeded from the rather vague principle that an unconstitutional
taking must be found if "the restriction on private property forces
some people alone to bear burdens which in all fairness and justice
should be borne by the public as a whole."'
' 0 3
The United States Supreme Court has identified three elements
as indicia of an unconstitutional taking - the economic impact or
diminution in value, the character of the regulation,"0 and the regu-
lation's interference with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions. 10 5 Application of this tripartite analysis to factual situations
brought before the Court has invariably resulted in affirmance of the
statute. The first element appears to be a threshold requirement for
a successful taking claim. One of the most frequent flaws has been
the failure to show a sufficient diminution in the present value of the
property. 0 6 At the outset, therefore, these cases are distinguishable
from fact situations that may arise under the Pennsylvania
SMCRA.
10 7
In Goldblau v. Hempstead, 108 for example, plaintiff was the
owner of a property on which a gravel pit was located. The owner
claimed that his property was "taken" in a constitutional sense by an
ordinance that prohibited excavation below the water table. The
Court concluded that it was of no constitutional consequence that
the ordinance prohibited the most beneficial use of the property, that
the excavation activity did not constitute a common law nuisance, or
that the property interest precluded by the ordinance was the re-
moval of the soil itself rather than its mere use. The fatal deficiency,
however, was plaintiffs failure to present any evidence that the pro-
hibition of excavation below the water table diminished the present
value of the lot on which the pit was located.
102. The failure to develop a taking by regulation rule is evidenced by the Court's own
admission. "[Tihis Court has generally been unable to develop a 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compen-
sated by the Government. ... Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 168 (1979).
103. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
104. In assessing the "character" of the regulation or government action, the Court has
considered both the physical nature and the substantive public policy of the regulation or
action. For example, the Court is more likely to find a taking when the regulation or action
involves a "physical invasion" of private property. See, e.g., Causby v. United States, 328 U.S.
256 (1946) (aircraft overflights of plaintiffs' property with attendant nuisance held to constitute
a taking). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (government's compel-
ling owner of a navigable marina to allow public access held to constitute a taking). On the
other hand, if the public interest furthered by the statute is substantial, it is less likely that a
taking will be found. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (public safety
ordinance prohibiting quarry excavation below the water table held not to effect a taking). But
see infra note Ill and accompanying text.
105. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
106. This does not mean that plaintiffs would have succeeded had they shown a diminu-
tion in value sufficient to meet the threshold requirement.
107. See supra notes 48 and 49 and accompanying text.
108. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
Similarly, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, i09 the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance used to des-
ignate Grand Central Terminal as a landmark site. The local zoning
commission had disapproved the owner's plans for building a multi-
story office building over the terminal. The Court, reaffirming the
dicta of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 'l recognized that "a state
statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so
frustrate distinct investment backed expectations as to amount to a
'taking'. . . . The Supreme Court held, however, that the prohi-
bition on making improvements to the train terminal neither inter-
fered with the present value of the property nor denied the owner a
reasonable return on investment."
2
Although cases in which a property owner has prevailed on a
taking claim are rare, the Supreme Court as recently as 1979 gave
renewed vitality to the principle of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon 113 by holding that regulation extended to a certain point will
constitute a taking for which just compensation must be made. The
Court's holding in Kaiser Aetna v. United States1" 4 may be of dubi-
ous assistance, however, to property owners aggrieved by SMCRA
provisions since the exercise of Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution," 15 and not state use
of the police power, grounded the taking claim in Kaiser Aetna.
Whether any court will consider this a material distinction remains
to be seen.
In Kaiser Aetna, the owners and lessees of a marina-type devel-
opment built around an inland pond had dredged a channel that
connected the pond with the ocean. In making the connection, the
owners relied on the advice of the United States Army Corps of En-
gineers that no permit would be required. When the channel be-
came deep enough to accommodate boat traffic between the pond
and the ocean, the federal government brought suit to resolve
whether the owners of the pond could deny public access to the
pond. The Government contended that the pond's connection with
the ocean made it a navigable waterway of the United States subject
to the dormant commerce power. In holding for the property owners
and their lessees, the Court made it clear that the power to regulate
and the power to take are separate and distinct authorities. Conse-
quently, Congress could forbid the owners from excluding the public
109. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
110. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
111. 438 U.S. at 127.
112. Id at 136.
113. 260 U.S. 793 (1922). See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
114. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
115. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
from the pond, but could not do so without making just compensa-
tion to the pond owners.-
The Kaiser Aetna Court applied the tripartite test of Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 1I6 First, the Court char-
acterized the economic impact of government regulation of access to
the pond as not "insubstantial." ' 17 Second, compelling public access
would interfere with the owner's reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectation that property rights in the pond included the "[fundamen-
tal] right to exclude.""1I8 In finding this expectation reasonable, the
Court thought two factors important: under state law inland ponds
could be held as private property; and the acquiescence of the Corps
of Engineers gave rise to an expectation that the pond would remain
private property. Third, the Court emphasized that the character of
the governmental action constituted a "physical invasion" '119 of the
property. The Court did not address the degree of public purpose in
the federal government's action, as it normally does in applying this
"character" portion of the Penn Central Transportation Co. test.
120
Presumably, allowing public access over navigable waterways im-
ports a rather substantial public purpose. The Court's omission,
however, might be explained by the "public purpose" nuance of the
"character" criterion, which is peculiar to cases concerning the police
power authority of the government.
2. Environmental Protection. -In the only case in which the
taking issue has been adjudicated by the United States Supreme
Court in the context of environmental protection, the constitutional
claim did not prevail. In Andrus v. Allard, 121 the owners of Ameri-
can Indian artifacts containing eagle feathers were prosecuted under
the Eagle Protection Act. 122 Regulations promulgated pursuant to
the Act prohibited the sale of feathers taken from eagles, including
birds killed before the Act protected the eagle. 123 In rejecting the
owners' taking claim, the Court also implicitly rejected the necessity
of applying the full Penn Central Transportation Co. test in every
case alleging a taking by regulation. Instead, the Court focused its
116. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
117. 444 U.S. at 180. Tenants living in the marina development were required to pay a fee
toward maintenance of the pond. Opening the pond to public use would have forced the
tenants in effect to pay for the maintenance of a public accommodation.
118. Id at 179-80. The "right to exclude" was later held not to be fundamental in the
taking context if its deprivation does not demonstrably interfere with the owner's economic
interest in the property. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (statute
that prohibited shopping center owners from ejecting persons from the premises for exercising
first amendment rights is not a taking of the owners' property).
119. 444 U.S. at 180. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
120. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
121. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
122. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1970).
123. 50 C.F.R. § 22.2(a) (1978).
inquiry on the property rights that the statute left undisturbed, not-
ing that "denial of one traditional property right [the right to sell]
does not always amount to a taking. . . where an owner possesses a
full 'bundle' of property rights .. ."I24
While the owners of the feathers were deprived of the right to
sell them, they retained the right to possess, transport, donate, dis-
play, or devise them. The Court concluded that "loss of future prof-
its-unaccompanied by any physical property restriction -provides a
slender reed upon which to rest a taking claim."' 25 Finally, the
Court effectively overruled Holmes' "reciprocity of advantage" crite-
rion "'26 by citing Justice Brandeis' dissenting remark in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. that if reciprocal advantage to the property owner is requi-
site to upholding the validity of a regulation of the use of property,
this advantage is found in the property owner's privilege of "living
and doing business in a civilized community."'
' 27
Apparently, the test developed by the Supreme Court to tame
Pennsylvania Coal Co., but to retain its basic premise, is less than
consistently applied. Consequently, federal district courts have
reached opposite conclusions when faced with the taking issue in the
context of the federal SMCRA. 28
VI. SMCRA Constitutional Controversy in the Federal Courts
A. Federal District Courts Split Evenly on the Taking Issue
Litigants have launched a plethora of constitutional challenges
against the federal SMCRA in the federal courts, and a number of
these attacks have succeeded.' 29 In Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Association v. Andrus, "30 the District Court for the Western
District of Virginia held that the provisions requiring "steep slopes"
to be restored to approximate original contour13 ' and those prohibit-
124. 444 U.S. at 65-66.
125. Id at 66 (emphasis added). The negative implication of this statement would seem
to be that a loss of future profitsplus a physical restriction on the use of property might present
a stronger case for a taking by regulation. SMCRA provisions may have precisely this effect
on surface mining operators and coal bearing land owners. See supra notes 47-49 and accom-
panying text. In distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal Co., the Court noted, "It should be empha-
sized that in Pennsylvania Coal the loss of profit opportunity was accompanied by a physical
restriction against the removal of coal." 444 U.S. at 66 n.22. The Court in this footnote may
have been hinting that in the taking analysis, a "physical restriction" may be the legal
equivalent of a "physical invasion" of a property interest. See supra note 104 and accompany-
ing text.
126. 260 U.S. at 415. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
127. 260 U.S. at 422.
128. See infra notes 129-70 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 130-52 and accompanying text.
130. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980).
131. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (Supp. 1979) requires that mined land be restored to approxi-
mate contour. Operators in this case objected to § 1265(d), which imposes additional require-
ments for mining on "steep slopes," defined as "any slope above twenty degrees or such lesser
slope as may be defined by the regulatory authority .. ." Id § 1265(d)(4). These additional
ing surface mining in designated areas1 32 deprived owners and oper-
ators of their property without just compensation. The court based
its holding on extensive findings of fact, finding that ninety-five per-
cent of the stripable lands in Virginia were located on slopes in ex-
cess of twenty degrees. 33 Given the topography of western Virginia,
the court found it to be not only economically infeasible, but physi-
cally impossible, to restore the slopes to approximate original con-
tour after removing the coal. Even if restoration were possible, the
value of the mountainous land in its restored natural state would be
"diminished to practically nothing." 134  The court found no redemp-
tion for the statute in a variance provision. 3- In order to obtain a
variance, an operator would be required to completely cover the
highwall t36 of the mined slope by backfilling, a requirement the Dis-
trict Court believed was infeasible.
Detecting no "reciprocity of advantage" accruing to the opera-
tors, the court declared that the case was "on all fours with Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 'M7 Like the statute in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. 138 the challenged SMCRA provision deprived owners and
operators not only of the most profitable use but of all beneficial use
of their land. In basing its holding on Pennsylvania Coal Co., the
court distinguished the litany of subsequent cases in which taking
claims had failed, on the ground that the property owners did not
allege a diminution in value comparable to that suffered by western
Virginian land owners and operators at the hands of SMCRA. 139
Applying the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 4o
test, the court found that the "steep slope" provision frustrated prop-
erty owners' reasonable investment-backed expectations but stated
requirements include complete backfilling with spoil material to cover the highwall com-
pletely. According to DER, very little of Pennsylvania's surface mining is done on "steep
slopes." Interview with John Dernbach, DER staff attorney, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
(Sept. 26, 1981). For regulations governing "steep slope" mining and restoration see 25 PA.
CODE § 87.174 (1980) (Reserved), reprinted in 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4789, 4850.
132. 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. 1979).
133. 483 F. Supp. at 437.
134. Id The district court found that if returned to approximate original contour, the
rugged Appalachian land would have a market value of between five and seventy-five dollars
per acre. If leveled, the land could command from $5000 to $300,000 per acre. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court held this finding was of no consequence since, if true, the owners
always had the option of leveling the land without first mining the coal. Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2370.
135. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(e)(1) (Supp. 1979). In finding the variance provision illusory, the
court relied on the Department of the Interior's own admissions that the highwall requirement
"will limit the usefulness of the variance in very steep slopes... [and] may make the variance
of little use in certain instances." 44 Fed. Reg. 61,313 (1979).
136. "Highwali" refers to that portion of a surface mine excavation nearest to the crest of
the slope.
137. 483 F. Supp. at 441. But see supra notes 126 & 127 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
140. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
that this alone would not constitute a raking. In the court's estima-
tion, the crucial fact was that "a return to approximate original con-
tour on steep slopes is environmentally unsound and may create
dangerous conditions." 4' Since the provision did not effect an envi-
ronmental benefit but might in fact bring about an environmental
detriment, the balance tipped against the constitutional validity of
the "steep slope" provision.' 42
Without making any similar findings of fact or considering the
actual public interest furthered by the provisions prohibiting surface
mining in designated areas, 43 the Court for the Western District of
Virginia declared the prohibitory provisions of SMCRA to be consti-
tutionally infirm on the ground that they amounted to "a physical
restriction against the removal of coal, and ... require[d] a total
loss of profit opportunity.'"
44
SMCRA was again held to offend the constitution in Indiana v.
Andrus, 145 in which the petitioners, owners and operators of subsur-
face mineral interests within the state sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against enforcement of the prime farmlands restoration
146 thein c4provision. I Like the court in Virginia Surface Mining,'47 the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Indiana proceeded from fac-
tual findings regarding the practical impact of the law. The court
found that it is physically impossible to restore mined prime farm-
lands to prior levels of yield when those same lands had previously
been under a "high" level of management. 48  Likening the case to
141. 483 F. Supp. at 441. The court explained,
A return to approximate original contour on a steep slope increases sedimentation
because of the increased erosion from the unstable mass. In addition, a dangerous
condition may be created by backfilling the bench. When overburdened material is
stacked up against the highwall the normal process of settlement of the fill material
tends to pull itself away from the highwall. This provides a natural channel for water
from the upper slope to flow down to the bench below and saturate the underlying
material, creating an unstable mass with a likelihood of eventual collapse.
Id at 435. The court cited a number of studies commissioned by the United States Govern-
ment. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ERO-
SION AND SEDIMENTATION CONTROL, SURFACE MINING IN THE EASTERN U.S. (1976). This
finding might be viewed as analogous to the Supreme Court's finding of a "limited" public
purpose in the statute considered in Pennsylvania Coal Co. See supra note 96 and accompany-
ing text.
142. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d) (Supp. 1979).
143. Id § 1272.
144. 483 F. Supp. at 442. See supra note 125 and accompanying-text.
145. 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980), rev'dsub noma. Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376
(1981). The State of Indiana joined the coal companies in this litigation solely to contest the
tenth amendment issue. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
146. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1260(d)(1), 1258(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 1979).
147. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980). See supra notes 130-44 and accompanying text.
148. The district court explained,
There are no known studies conducted by agricultural schools or other scientific data
which demonstrate that, using the required methods of reclamation for prime farm-
land, prior levels of yield under high levels of management can be achieved. The
research and studies conducted to date demonstrate that at best, prior productivity
can be achieved only under basic levels of management. The difference between
productivity under basic levels of management and high levels of management is
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, "I the court noted that the com-
plaining parties in both cases did not own the surface but only the
coal underneath. Since it was impossible to comply with the prime
farmlands restoration requirements, the SMCRA made restoration a
condition of obtaining a permit, the mineral estate, like the estate in
Pennsylvania Coal Co., was effectively extinguished without
compensation.
The Indiana district court also followed the Virginia Surface
Mining court 5 ' by invalidating SMCRA provisions that designated
areas unsuitable for surface mining' 51 and prohibiting surface min-
ing within specified distances of certain places, 152 without making
any specific findings of fact.
Two federal courts presented with similar taking challenges
have sustained the validity of SMCRA. In Concerned Citizens of Ap-
palachia, 153 the petitioners, relying on Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 154 sought injunctive and declaratory relief against enforce-
ment of various SMCRA reclamation provisions.'5 5 The petitioners
introduced evidence tending to show that SMCRA reclamation re-
quirements were excessively expensive to comply with and of ques-
tionable environmental value.
Holding that the reclamation provisions did not effect an un-
compensated taking, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee distinguished SMCRA from the statute struck down in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. 156 in two particulars. First, the petitioners
had not alleged that SMCRA reclamation provisions "totally de-
stroyed" the economic value of their real property.157 The court
noted, "[T]he reclamation provisions are not physically impossible to
comply with, nor would they be economically prohibitive to an oper-
ator with enough capital." '158 Second, the court found that SMCRA,
unlike the statute invalidated in Pennsylvania Coal Co., 159 was
designed to further a substantial public interest in environmental
approximately one third. . . .That is, yields obtained by high levels of management
are approximately one third greater than those obtained under basic levels of
management.
501 F. Supp. at 470.
149. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
150. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980). See supra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
151. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a) (Supp. 1979).
152. Id at § 1272(e).
153. 494 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
154. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
155. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1260, 1265 and 1271 (Supp. 1979).
156. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
157. 494 F. Supp. at 681.
158. Id (emphasis added). In this respect, the holding in this case might be said to reflect
a factual deficiency in petitioner's case.
159. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
protection. Despite evidence produced by the petitioners' 60 that rec-
lamation was an ineffective method to protect the environment from
the hazards of strip mining, the District Court in Tennessee deferred
to Congress' judgment that reclamation furthered a substantial pub-
lic interest.' 6' Concerning the "character" of SMCRA, the district
court thought it dispositive that "rather than being characterized as a
'physical invasion' by the government, the regulatory scheme is a
conscious 'adjusting' of the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good. .. .
The Department of the Interior fended off another broad-based
constitutional attack in Star Coal Co. v. Andrus. 163 In Star Coal, an
operator had been issued a notice of violation for failure to include
in its permit application information required for mining and restor-
ing prime farmlands. The operator defended the omission, asking
for injunctive and declaratory relief on the ground that the restora-
tion to prior yield" 4 and topsoil restoration 165 requirements were
technologically impossible to satisfy. After distinguishing Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 166 in the manner of the Tennessee court
in Concerned Citizens ofAppalachia v. Andrus, 167 the court concluded
that since the challenged provisions involved no "physical inva-
sion"'161 of the property but rather adjusted "the benefits and bur-
160. Compare the factual consideration engaged in by the district court in Virginia Surface
Mining. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
161. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (Supp. 1979) declares,
Surface mining and reclamation technology are now developed so that effective and
reasonable regulation of surface coal mining operations by the States and by the
Federal Government in accordance with the requirements of this chapter is an appro-
priate and necessary means to minimize so far as practicable the adverse social, eco-
nomic and environmental effects of such mining operations.
Id (emphasis added). This subsection creates a presumption that SMCRA reclamation provi-
sions are technologically feasible to satisfy. This presumption suggests that the district court in
State of Indiana v. Andrus engaged in an erroneous analysis of the validity of the prime farm-
lands restoration requirements. The Andrus court held for the operators because it found no
scientific evidence to prove that the restoration of prime farmland to prior levels of yield is
technologically feasible. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. The congressional
finding represented in § 1201(e) seems to impose a rather heavy burden of proof on any party
seeking to establish that the restoration requirements are infeasible.
162. 494 F. Supp. at 681 (citing Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978)). The "physical invasion" criterion may be of specious materiality in taking by regula-
tion cases since it is borrowed from cases involving governmental trespass and nuisances. See,
e.g., Causby v. United States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); supra note 104 and accompanying text.
163. 14 Env't Rep. Cas (BNA) 1325 (S.D. Iowa 1980), vacatedsub noam. Watt v. Star Coal
Co., 101 S. Ct. 3132 (1981).
164. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(d)(1) (Supp. 1979).
165. Id § 1265(b)(7). Petitioners contended that under the current state of the art, once
the topsoil is stripped for mining, it cannot be returned to its former structure for at least
twenty years. The court acknowledged that "ItIhis evidence suggests that the regulatory agen-
cies may need to give this requirement a liberal construction in interpreting the reclamation
standard in the context of the state of the art." 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1332. The court,
however, did not consider this evidence controlling in the face of congressional findings to the
contrary. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
166. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
167. 494 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
168. 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1332.
dens of economic life,"' 6 9 application of the provisions did not effect
a taking of the coal company's property in contravention of the fifth
amendment.
70
B. The United States Supreme Court Defers Judgment
The Virginia and Indiana cases reached the Supreme Court as
companion cases-Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association17' and Hodel v. Indiana. 172 In the Virginia case, a unani-
mous court rejected constitutional challenges based on the Com-
merce Clause, 173 the tenth amendment,' 74 and the fifth amendment
due process clause. 7 5 Notably, the court declined to pass final judg-
ment on the fifth amendment taking issue until that issue should
arise within the context of a justiciable controversy.' 76
[T]he District Court's ruling on the 'taking' issue suffers from a
fatal deficiency: Neither appellees nor the court identified any
property in which appellees have an interest that has allegedly
been taken by operation of the Act. . . . [T]he constitutionality of
169. Id
170. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The court did, however, find violative of due process 30
U.S.C. § 1268(c) (Supp. 1979), which requires prepayment of civil penalties assessed against
operators prior to a hearing on the merits. But see infra note 175 and accompanying text.
171. 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
172. 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
173. The appellees had argued that since land cannot be considered "in commerce," the
federal government could regulate land use only insofar as permitted by the Property Clause.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Court rejected this argument and applied the standard
Commerce Clause test, finding that a rational basis existed for Congress' finding that surface
mining affects interstate commerce and that uniform national standards were necessary to in-
sure that unfair competition did not prevent the several states from enacting adequate regula-
tory schemes. Appellees did not challenge the rational relation of the adopted means to the
mitigation of adverse affects on interstate commerce but contended that SMCRA provisions
were duplicative of other federal statutes. The Court was unpersuaded by this argument, find-
ing it sufficient that "the Act's regulatory scheme is. rationally related to the goals Congress
sought to accomplish." 101 S. Ct. at 2363.
174. Relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the district court
had held SMCRA violative of the tenth amendment limitation on the commerce power, con-
cluding that the Act impermissibly usurped the states' traditional function of regulating land
use. 483 F. Supp. at 433. The Supreme Court held that in order to qualify for invalidation
under a National League of Cities rationale, a challenged statute must purport to regulate
"States as States," which SMCRA did not do because the restoration requirements regulate
only the activities of private coal companies. 101 S. Ct. at 2366. The Court also rejected
appellees argument that the Act violates the tenth amendment insofar as it coerces states into
adopting federally mandated standards. The Court noted that the Act does not in fact coerce
states but rather gives them the option of participating in the federal jurisdiction sharing
scheme or relinquishing primary jurisdiction over their surface mining to the United States
Department of the Interior. 101 S. Ct. at 2367. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
175. The district court had held violative of due process 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (Supp.
1979), which instructs the Secretary of the Interior to issue immediate cessation orders when-
ever he determines that an operator is in violation of the Act or the operation poses an imme-
diate danger. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the section, finding that statutory
guidelines in 30 U.S.C. § 1291(8) (Supp. 1979), were more than adequate to prevent issuance
of arbitrary or erroneous cessation orders.
176. The Supreme Court also held premature the challenge to 30 U.S.C. § 1268(c) (Supp.
1979), which requires that operators cited for violations of the Act pre-pay civil penalties
before a hearing on the merits. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.22 (Purdon Supp. 1981)
corresponds to this section and so may also remain open to constitutional challenge.
statutes ought not be decided except in an actual factual setting
that makes such decision neceesary.177
Since SMCRA had not been applied to any particular property, the
Court concluded that the statute easily passed the test for facial con-
stitutionality: a statute regulating the use of private property will be
held facially unconstitutional only when its mere enactment denies
the owner an economically viable use of his land. 78  The Court
found that SMCRA did not.
[T]he Act does not on its face prevent beneficial use of coal bear-
ing lands. Except for the proscription of mining near certain loca-
tions by [30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)] the Act does not categorically
prohibit surface coal mining, it merely regulates conditions under
which such operations may be conducted The Act does not pur-
port to regulate alternative uses to which coal bearing lands may
be put. 1
79
Two additional points of the district court's opinion were found
to have been erroneous. First, the district court had held that the
variance procedure for the "steep slope" restoration provision 80 pro-
vided operators with no meaningful relief since they would, in any
case, be required to completely cover the highwall.' 8 ' The Supreme
Court found that this conclusion was premature. The operators had
not identified any instance in which the highwall requirement pre-
vented them from obtaining a variance. Second, the district court
had also held the SMCRA provision that prohibits surface mining
near designated areas 182 to constitute a taking. The Supreme Court
pointed out that the provision was expressly subject to "valid ex-
isting rights,"'' 83 and rejected the operators' contention that the
"valid existing rights" exception, as interpreted by the Department
of the Interior, applied only to specific operations for which all re-
quired permits had been issued prior to August 3, 1977.184 The
Court concluded that this interpretation "[was] not compelled either
by the statutory language or its legislative history"' 85 but did not
express any opinion on the proper interpretation of "valid existing
rights." Apparently, this remains an open question.
177. 101 S. Ct. at 2369.
178. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
179. 101 S. Ct. at 2370.
180. 30 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. 1979). See supra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
181. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d)(2) (Supp. 1979).
182. Id § 1272.
183. Id § 1272(e). See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
185. 101 S. Ct. at 2370. The Court noted that appellees interpretation of "valid existing
rights" was apparently based on 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a)(2)(i) (1980), which had been remanded
to the Secretary of the Interior for reconsideration. In any case, appellees interpretation would
be consistent with DER's definition of "valid existing rights." See supra note 53 and accompa-
nying text. Under the Pennsylvania regulation, an owner of mining rights would not enjoy the
protection of this "valid existing rights" clause unless he had, at a minimum, completed the
permit application procedure before August 3, 1977.
Although the Supreme Court found SMCRA valid as against a
facial challenge, dicta proffered by Justice Marshall 8 6 and a concur-
ring opinion by Justice Powell hinted that if the matter were to re-
turn to the Court under a concrete factual setting, SMCRA as
applied might not withstand a fifth amendment taking clause attack.
Justice Marshall wrote for the Court,
Although we conclude that 'mere enactment' of the Act did not
effect a taking of private property, this holding does not preclude
appellees or other coal mine operators from attempting to show
that as applied to particular parcels of land, the Act and the Secre-
tary's regulations effect a taking. Even then such an alleged tak-
ing is not unconstitutional unless just compensation is
unavailable.' 
87
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell repeated Justice Marshall's
admonition: "The Court's decision thus is confined to a holding that
the Act is not facially unconstitutional."' 8  He also noted that the
Act as applied to the terrain of western Virginia seemed "particu-
larly unrealistic."'8 9
In Hodel v. Indiana, the Supreme Court accorded appellees'
constitutional challenges essentially the same treatment as it had in
the Virginia case. After rejecting Commerce Clause,"g  tenth
amendment, due process, and equal protection' 91 objections, the
Court declined to decide whether the SMCRA prime farmlands pro-
186. Justice Marshall was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.
187. 101 S. Ct. at 2371 n.40.
188. Id at 2375.
189. Id at 2376.
190. The district court had held that the restoration of prime farmlands was not an appro-
priate subject for congressional regulation under the commerce power because loss of agricul-
tural production due to surface mining had no substantial effect on interstate commerce. The
court found that at the rate surface mining was disturbing prime farmlands, it would take 166
years to affect one percent of the prime farmlands in the United States. 501 F. Supp. at 459.
The Supreme Court rejected this analysis (even if statistically correct), stating that the question
is one not of quantitative effect on commerce, but whether Congress had a rational basis for
finding that the activity affects commerce at all. 101 S. Ct. at 2383 citing Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942)). Citing testimony presented at extensive hearings on the matter, the
Court concluded that indeed a rational basis existed for Congress' finding that surface mining
affects agricultural production and, hence, interstate commerce. See SURFACE MINING CON-
TROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977: HEARINGS ON S. 7 BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 775-811 (1977); SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMA-
TION ACT OF 1977: HEARINGS ON H.R. 2 BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16-31, 78-92, 159-172, 235-260 (1977).
191. The district court had also held the prime farmlands provisions violative of fifth
amendment due process and equal protection because SMCRA does not provide for variances
from the prime farmlands requirements, while providing for variances from the "steep slope"
requirements. The district court believed that this discriminated against operators in the rela-
tively flat Midwest. Predictably, the Supreme Court did not agree, holding that a claim of
arbitrariness could not rest on a statute's lack of uniform geographic impact, and that in any
case there was a rational basis for the distinction. 101 S. Ct. at 2387.
visions'9 2 took private property in violation of the fifth amendment.
As in the companion case, the appellees' allegations did not present a
justiciable controversy. Although the operators alleged that they in-
tended to mine on prime farmland in the immediate future, they did
not allege that they were required, as a prerequisite to obtaining a
permit, to show that they possessed the capability to restore prime
farmlands to prior yields under "high levels of management." 193
VII. Application and Analysis
To succeed on a taking claim, an owner or operator would have
to show that the Pennsylvania SMCRA has a not "insubstantial"'
194
economic impact on him, that one or more of its provisions consti-
tute a "physical restriction on the removal of coal,"' 9 5 and that those
provisions frustrate his "reasonable investment backed expecta-
tions."'' 96 To determine the type of proof an aggrieved operator will
be required to present and the chance of success, one analysis divides
the potentially objectionable sections of the Pennsylvania SMCRA
into two categories-the reclamation provisions197 and the prohibi-
tory provisions. 1
98
A. The Reclamation Provisions
As a threshold requirement, an owner or operator would have
to show that restoration of mined lands to approximate original con-
tour, or to higher or better uses, or to prior levels of yield, is either
physically impossible or economically infeasible. Proving physical
impossibility would be difficult in the face of a presumptively correct
congressional finding that surface mining technology has advanced
to the point at which satisfying the reclamation requirements is pos-
sible.' 99 The chances of proving economic infeasibility could be
even more remote. Compliance with the new law will undoubtedly
involve greater cost. The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly
stated that increased cost alone does not satisfy the threshold taking
requirement.2°
192. Id at 2387. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1260(a)(1), 1269(c)(2); supra note 42 and accompany-
ing text.
193. 101 S. Ct. at 238. Although it declined to pass on the validity of the prime farmlands
restoration provisions, the Court noted that these provisions do not prohibit surface mining,
but merely regulate conditions under which it may be conducted. Id
194. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 180.
195. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66 n.22.
196. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
197. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
200. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 ("Government hardly could go on
if to some extent values could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law.").
The cost of reclamation depends on type of coal mined, slope of
the terrain, depth of the deposit, and types of geological formations
near the site.20 1 The average cost of restoring a bituminous strip
mine is significantly lower in Pennsylvania than in the more moun-
tainous regions of Appalachia.2 °2 In the only litigation concerning
the Pennsylvania SMCRA to date,20 3 coal companies have claimed
that the cost of complying with the new permit requirements will add
from one dollar to one and one-half dollars per ton to the price of
surface bituminous coal and that the gathering of reclamation infor-
mation for permit applications would require twelve to twenty
months, as opposed to six months under the old law.2" The coal
companies complain that such a delay in production would force
many operators out of business.20 5
Although there would seem to be some potential at least to show
a substantial adverse economic impact on the Pennsylvania coal in-
dustry in general stemming from the reclamation requirements, the
allegations noted do no more than aver increased costs and do not
address the threshold taking requirement-a diminution in value of
a specific property due to governmental regulation.2° It is axiomatic
that increased cost of producing coal diminishes its value to the own-
er but it does not follow that this diminution is sufficient to satisfy
even the threshold taking requirement. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,207 for example, the statute invalidated was prohibitory
rather than regulatory because enforcement totally deprived the
owner of his property. The United States Supreme Court has re-
cently reiterated this distinction in construing the federal SM-
CRA,2 °8 noting that the Act's reclamation provisions do not
"categorically prohibit surface coal mining' [they] merely regulate
conditions under which such oparations may be conducted.
20 9
Considering the holding of Pennsylvania Coal Co. and the language
of Virginia Surface Mining, some doubt exists whether regulation of
the use of property absent absolute prohibition against its use will
ever be a sufficient basis for a taking claim.' 0
Although arguably not a prerequisite to relief, an aggrieved op-
201. Maneval, Coal Mining v. Environment.- A Reconciliation in Pennsylvania, in COAL
SURFACE MINING: IMPACTS OF RECLAMATION 107, 133 (J. Rowe ed. 1979).
202. Id On the average it cost the State of Pennsylvania $500 per acre to reclaim bitumi-
nous strip mines when operators had not done so and forfeited their bonds.
203. See Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Commonwealth, No. 2718 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Nov. 26, 1980).
204. Record, Vol. 1, at 40a-41a, Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n, No.
81-1-7 (Pa., Feb. 19, 1981).
205. Id at 42a.
206. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
207. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 171-93 and accompanying text.
209. 101 S. Ct. at 2370.
210. See supra notes 101-27 and accompanying text.
erator might benefit from a showing that the reclamation require-
ments as applied to his parcel of land, while amounting to a physical
restriction on the removal of coal, do not in fact further any signifi-
cant environmental purpose. 21 ' Again, however, the operator would
encounter a congressional finding that the reclamation requirements
do produce environmental benefits.21 2
An operator would also be required to show that conditioning
permit issuance on the operator's demonstrated ability to comply
with the restoration requirements frustrated "reasonable investment
backed expectations. 2 13 At minimum, this would require that the
aggrieved owner or operator obtained an interest in the coal bearing
property before enactment of the federal SMCRA on August 3, 1977.
If an owner or operator took the interest with constructive notice of
the reclamation requirements to which he would eventually be sub-
ject, his expectation to mine the land without complying with SM-
CRA could hardly be characterized as reasonable. A second factor
militating against an owner's or operator's expectation is that even
prior to the 1980 amendments to the Pennsylvania SMCRA,2 14 the
state was already enforcing stringent reclamation requirements.21 5
For example, the new requirement of restoration of mined land to
approximate original contour is the functional equivalent of "back-
filling" under the old law.216 Although the old law contained no
provision equivalent to the prime farmlands requirement,21 7 the re-
mainder of the reclamation requirements under the new law are suf-
ficiently similar to those already in force in Pennsylvania to negate
the conclusion that an owner or operator could reasonably entertain
the expectation that he could extract coal by the surface mining
method without complying with stringent land reclamation
requirements.2 18
B. The Prohibitory Provisions
Unlike the reclamation requirements, the prohibitory provisions
will entirely eliminate surface mining in certain areas.2 ' 9 As a result,
211. See supra notes 141 & 142 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
213. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 190.
214. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 3 & 31 and accompanying text.
216. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4(b) (Purdon 1966).
217. Id § 1396.4(a)(2)(J). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
218. The United States Supreme Court has on two occasions emphasized that what is a
reasonable expectation in property rights is a function of state law, even in the face of a federal
taking challenge. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 72, 84 (1980) ("Nor as a
general proposition is the United States, as opposed to the several states, possessed of the
residual authority that enables it to define 'property' in the first instance."); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. at 179.
219. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1396.4e(a),(b)&(h) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See supra
notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text.
any existing subsurface mineral interest will be automatically extin-
guished in fact if not in law.22° Thus, factual situations arising under
these provisions of the Pennsylvania SMCRA will likely be more
analogous to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon22' than those situa-
tions arising under the purely regulatory reclamation requirements.
This permits the inference that the owner or operator aggrieved by a
prohibitory provision, rather than a regulatory provision, would fare
better on the merits of a taking claim. Presumably, the owner of a
fee in the surface as well as in the underlying minerals would be
unlikely to succeed because an alternative use of the property would
remain notwithstanding the prohibition against coal mining.222 One
who owned an interest in only the subsurface coal, however, would
seem to stand in precisely the same position as the complaining sub-
surface owner in Pennsylvania Coal Co. 223 Had that case been fol-
lowed in recent decisions, the relevant inquiry would be brief and
the owner's chances of success excellent. Since Pennsylvania Coal
Co. has not been literally applied by any court, the question be-
comes whether these prohibitions on surface mining a subsurface es-
tate pass the tripartite test developed in subsequent cases.22 4
The first part of the test is met because a diminution in value is
clearly established by de facto extinguishment of the subsurface es-
tate. A second inquiry focuses on the "character" of the statutory
provisions. Although these prohibitory provisions can undoubtedly
be cheracterized as a "physical restriction on the removal of coal,"225
which the Supreme Court has indicated could constitute a taking,
226
the owner's or operator's opportunity to show that the prohibitions
do not in fact further environmental concerns seems effectively fore-
closed. This foreclosure may distinguish Pennsylvania Coal Co. from
cases arising under the prohibitory provisions of SMCRA.22 7 Appli-
cation of the prohibitory provisions by DER in order to designate an
area as unsuitable for surface mining228 must be preceded by a find-
ing that surface mining in a particular area will be environmentally
detrimental regardless of the care exercised by the operator.229 Like-
wise, the provision that prohibits surface mining within specified dis-
tances of designated places230 clearly protects prospective neighbors
220. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
221. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
222. Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (prohibition on the sale of artifacts not a
taking where owner retained the right to alternative uses).
223. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 101-27 and accompanying text.
225. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66 n.22.
226. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
228. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
229. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
230. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(h) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
of a planned surface mine against the acknowledged nuisances inci-
dent to surface mining operations near inhabited areas. 23' Finally,
the public interest in acid-free waters has been recognized by
courts 232 and would serve to sustain the prohibition of surface min-
ing within one hundred feet of a stream.
The final and possibly determinative inquiry surrounds the pro-
hibitory provisions' impact on reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations. All three provisions are, of course, subject to rights in
existence prior to August 3, 1977. Mere ownership of subsurface
rights, however, has been determined by DER not to be sufficient to
exclude any particular interest from coverage.233 Hence, any subsur-
face interest in coal in which no "substantial legal and financial com-
mitments, ' ' 234 existed, or for which a permit application had not
been made235 prior to August 3, 1977, would be subject to these pro-
hibitory provisions.
Consequently, no subsurface owner who acquired mere owner-
ship without more after August 3, 1977 could entertain a reasonable
expectation of extracting the coal in contravention of the prohibitory
provisions. Thus, the statute effectively establishes two classes of
property owners: those with rights in existence prior to August 3,
1977, who are immune from these sections; and those who either
held mere ownership on that date or acquired ownership thereafter,
who are not immune. This interpretation presents at least one diffi-
culty. Although owners in the latter category took their interest with
constructive notice of the statute and arguably cannot reasonably ex-
pect immunity from it, the prohibitory provisions could be prospec-
tive in application. The event giving rise to the prohibition on surface
mining any particular tract of land may occur years after the owner
acquired his interest.
For example, DER may designate a particular area unsuitable
for surface mining if it determines the existence of certain statutorily
defined criteria,2 36 but must do so only if it finds reclamation infeasi-
ble. 237 A prospective owner, before taking a subsurface interest after
August 3, 1977, must speculate whether the area in which the coal
231. In addition to major environmental problems, surface mining has been associated
with a number of localized nuisances, including fine particulate pollution of the air, noise, and
creation of stagnant ponds in which mosquitoes breed. See Bosselman, The Control of Surface
Mining: An Exercise in Creative Federalism, in COAL SURFACE MINING: IMPACT OF RECLA-
MATION 289, 290-91 (J. Rowe ed. 1979).
232. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
234. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
235. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(h) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
236. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981). See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
237. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4e(a) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
lies will someday be designated unsuitable for surface mining. Thus,
the owner acquiring an interest after August 3, 1977, or an owner
who possessed a dormant interest before that date, could be said to
have reasonably entertained an expectation at the time he acquired
his interest that he would be legally entitled to mine the coal.
Similarly, the provision prohibiting surface mining near certain
places 238 may also operate prospectively and so frustrate investment-
backed expectations. 239 Although this expectation could be reason-
able in another state, it might not be reasonable in Pennsylvania be-
cause of the peculiarity of pre-existing Pennsylvania law. A nearly
identical provision has been part of Pennsylvania law since 197 1.240
One who acquired an interest after that time arguably assumed the
risk that a portion of his interest could be foreclosed after his acqui-
sition by an occurrence such as the building of an occupied dwelling
within three hundred feet.2 4 ' On the other hand, since no dwelling
existed within three hundred feet of the property at the time of acqui-
sition, the owner of the adjacent coal interest could possibly enter-
tain a reasonable expectation that no dwelling would be built within
three hundred feet before extraction of the coal in that portion of the
tract. A determination of what is a reasonable expectation is likely
to depend on the particular facts as well the pertinent law.
24 2
VIII. Conclusion
When and if the taking issue arises under the provisions of the
Pennsylvania SMCRA, constitutionality is likely to depend upon
whether the challenged provision is reclamatory or prohibitory. If
reclamatory, a fifth amendment challenge will be unlikely to succeed
because of the nearly insurmountable presumption of feasibility es-
tablished by congressional finding and the stringent requirements of
pre-existing Pennsylvania law. Hence, one complaining that the rec-
lamation requirements are so onerous that they amount to a de facto
physical restriction on the removal of coal will most likely be unable
to meet either the threshold taking requirement of a diminution in
present value of property that goes beyond mere added cost of doing
business, or the requirement that an investment-backed expectation
be reasonable. Despite Supreme Court dicta to the contrary, no pre-
cedent indicates that regulation of the use of property, without a
238. Id § 1396.4e(h).
239. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
240. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1395.4b(c) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
241. Since this provision was in effect at the time of enactment of the federal SMCRA, the
only "valid existing rights" in existence at that time with regard to 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1396.4e(h) (Purdon Supp. 1981), would be variances granted from the prohibitions of 52 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4b(c) (Purdon Supp. 1979). See supra note 52 and accompanying
text.
242. See supra notes 89-127 and accompanying text.
complete destruction of its value to the owner, will ever constitute a
taking.
Provisions that prohibit surface mining completely, however,
may be particularly vulnerable to a taking claim. An owner or oper-
ator who owns only the subsurface estate has prima facie met the
threshold taking requirement when the area under which his estate
lies is designated unsuitable for surface mining. In this case the es-
tate has been effectively extinguished. If the owner or operator can
show that his expectation to mine coal was a reasonable one under
state law as it existed at the time of acquisition, he may indeed pre-
vail on a taking claim.
Success, however, is not a certainty. The public purpose of the
provision is bound to be factored into the equation, and that public
purpose will most likely be deemed substantial. Nevertheless, lower
courts are bound by the Supreme Court's repeated admonition that a
taking may be found even if a statute furthers a substantial public
purpose.243 A case arising under one of the prohibitory provisions
may be virtually indistinguishable from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon. If such a case progresses to the Supreme Court, the Court
would have to hold for the aggrieved property owner or overrule
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. The latter choice is unlikely be-
cause the Court has favorably cited the case repeatedly and as re-
cently as last year.
In any case, a determination whether any of these new provi-
sions offends the constitution must wait at least until Pennsylvania
begins to fully implement its permanent SMCRA program. 24 When
it does, the shadow of the fifth amendment taking clause is likely to
temper DER's enforcement of the Act, even if the taking issue is
never litigated.
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